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Europeanization as Process
Thoughts on the Europeanization
of Private Law*

Christian Joerges**
The present efforts in Europe to achieve more uniformity in private law
and the debates on a European civil code need to be understood in a
wider context. Europe is plagued by concerns over its problem‐solving
potential and its acceptance amongst citizens. The response is ambi‐
tious projects: Eastern Enlargement, a Constitution, a Code. The project
of a European civil code is the least visible among the three—and yet
specifically instructive. Europe has to learn how the openness of na‐
tional markets can coexist with differences in legal cultures, differently
shaped relations between state and society. In its multi‐level system of
governance none of the established legal disciplines can provide guid‐
ance for the denationalization and Europeanization of private law. The
Europeanization process needs to be understood and organized as a
process of discovery and learning. Only then can Europe make produc‐
tive use of its diversity.
INTRODUCTION
European law is affecting more and more areas within national legal
systems. The processes of change that it initiates are complex and di‐
verse, to an extent that there are good reasons to concentrate in their
analysis on the discipline one feels most at home with. Hence, constitu‐
tional lawyers observe and comment on the constitutionalization of
Europe, administrative and commercial lawyers primarily on the emer‐
gence of complex European governance arrangements throughout the
fields of regulatory politics. At the same time, an autonomous epistemic
community is engaging in a discussion on the Europeanization of pri‐
vate law with a growing number of individual themes, fora, organisa‐
* Second Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law,
Sept. 16, 2003. Reprinted with the permission of Kluwer Law International: EUROPEANIZATION
AS PROCESS: THOUGHTS ON THE EUROPEANIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
JOURNAL 63 (2005).
** Research Professor, University of Bremen; Collaborative Centre on “Transformation of
the State.” Centre of European Law and Politics.
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tions and publications. Leading in terms of literary productivity are
German‐speaking academics. The most recent habilitation thesis I am
aware of was submitted in Munich. It looks beyond the traditional bor‐
ders between legal sub‐disciplines and focuses instead on the trans‐
formation of private law in the light of the integration process. It is 740
pages long (single spaced).1 But its German speaking predecessors
(there are around 10 of them), albeit more limited in scope, are not
significantly shorter.2
This is no coincidence. A tradition of legal science that under‐
stands the systematic analysis of the law as its core commitment, will
naturally feel challenged by the manifold impacts of the Europeaniza‐
tion process, and the less it becomes possible for legal science to com‐
ply with its own systematic expectation, the more its scepticism
towards that process will be fostered. To pose the question in an ironi‐
cally sounding, but nonetheless serious, form: should Europe be about
to take suit, to proceed, against our law (bring the law to trial)?3 Taking
the question seriously also means not to condemn Europe just because
it does not correspond with our inherited notion of the law. The chal‐
lenge flowing from the Europeanization process could be that it will
force us to redefine the normative proprium of the law.
This, in fact, is the thesis of my contribution. It sets out to show,
for one, that the Europeanization of private law should be seen as a
process that triggers disintegration within national private law systems
and affects their systematic consistency. But I also wish to demonstrate
how that process manages to uncover productive and innovative op‐
portunities. For this, as I suggest by way of conclusion below, it merits
recognition: Europeanization must derive its legitimacy from the nor‐
mative quality of the processes within which it takes place. There are
three steps to my argument. The first is fundamental, in the literal
sense; the legal disciplines instructing the Europeanization process
assume each in their own way that legal systems are organized nation‐
ally; Europe on the other hand constitutes a post‐national constellation;
it is no longer an aggregation of nation States, but a multi‐level system
(part A). The second part examines three different patterns of juridifi‐
1. Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische
Union, 2004.
2. Since Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers, 1998.
3. The formulation can be found by Wiethölter, ‘lst unserem Recht der Prozeβ zu
machen?’, in Honneth et al. (eds.), Zwischenbetrachtungen im Prozeβ der Aufklärung, 1989,
794. l have previously thought to show, referring to the emergence of ‘new modes of governance’, that it should be addressed to the European process; see Joerges, ‘Law, Economics
and Politics in the Constitutionalisation of Europe,’ 5 (2002-2003) The Cambridge Yearbook
of European Legal Studies, 2004, 123.
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cation, of RechtFertigung (‘justification’), induced by Europe, to docu‐
ment the opportunities and risks borne by the Europeanization proc‐
ess—and to demonstrate why the process itself cannot but disappoint
the dogmatic and systematic expectations of legal science (part B). In
the final part, I will further elucidate the normative perspectives that
can be associated with my title, ‘Europeanization as Process’ (part C).
A. THE CONTEST OF LEGAL DISCIPLINES AND THE MISERY OF
METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM
Three legal disciplines are trying to unravel and understand the proc‐
ess of Europeanization: European law, private international law and
comparative law. They all have different perspectives and introduce
contesting criteria of law. How are we to resolve the contest between
those legal disciplines4? Should European law Europeanize private law,
replace national private laws with a European private law? Is it for
comparative law to guide the quest for a suitable system of legal rules
for Europe? But surely, it is private international law’s vocation to in‐
struct Europe as to how it can reconcile its legal differences, to combine
the construction of a functioning European private law system and the
respect for national legal traditions? None of them, it is my claim, can
win the contest of the disciplines. None is equipped to deal with the
Europeanization process.
To be sure, the intention is not to pass judgment on the capabili‐
ties or disabilities of entire legal subjects. My argument, which pro‐
poses the insolubility of the contest of legal disciplines, rather follows
the specific tradition that underlies the statement, indicated above, that
legal science should be prepared to acknowledge Europe’s postnational
constellation.5 To follow up on a concretisation of this term, first coined
by Jurgen Habermas 6 and analysed by the political scientist Michael
Zürn: the individual legal disciplines must overcome their ‘methodo‐
logical nationalism,’7 their adherence in terms of concepts and method‐

4. In his famous treatise in 1798, which this section`s heading alludes to, Kant referred
not only to the sub-disciplines of one faculty. Alluding to Kant`s valuation of philosophy is
justified: jurisprudence, much to the contrary of Kant’s derisory remarks, cannot limit itself to a
function that serves given authorities, but must become productive and make use of what
Kant names ‘reason.’ See Joerges. “The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation
Process and as a Contest of Disciplines—An Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts,” 3 ERPL 3 (1995) 175.
5. Above, pre A.
6. “Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie,” in: Habermas, Die
postnationale Konstellation, Politische Essays, 1998, 91.
7. Zürn, “Politik in der postnationalen Konstellation,“ in Landfried (ed.), Politik in der
entgrenzten Welt, 2001, 181. Not only Zürn uses the term (see e.g. Beck, Beyond Methodo-
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ologies to national shapes; these shapes are being eroded as a conse‐
quence of European integration together with ‘globalization’ (de‐
territorializing (Entgrenzung) and denationalising) processes. Again: I
do not wish to pass judgment on the state of those disciplines; the in‐
tention is rather to highlight and reinforce the developments that are
verifiably taking place within the law and that should also be reflected
by legal science.
I. European Law
My claim, that legal science rather stubbornly adheres to national cate‐
gories of thought, must sound surprising, if not strange, in relation to
the discipline I discuss first, namely European law. Is not the European
construction exactly the negation, the Überwindung, of the nation state?
Is not the specific characteristic of European law precisely that, a claim
to supranational validity 8 without any need for Europe to become a
state first? And could not maybe private law, even though it is a ‘late
comer’ of the integration process, become somewhat of a test case for
transnational state‐free law, in particular when it would require no
more of private law than to revise its own traditions?
A dominating and most instructive topic currently under discus‐
sion within legal science and legal policy concerns the case for—or
rejection of—a European Civil Code. Numerous institutional and aca‐
demic groupings have contributed to the debate on the codification
project, in manifold ways.
The European Parliament (EP) in its resolutions of 1989 and 1994
pleaded for a European Civil Code.9 They did not have an immediate
impact,10 but did help to keep the idea alive. By now, the EP has become
more cautious, or at least more patient.11 The Commission is more sib‐
ylline. In its Communication on contract law in 2001,12 it presented four
options and asked: Should the European private law be generated
through a contest between legal orders? Should Europe draft Restate
ments following the American model? Should it ‘consolidate’ first what
logical Nationalism, Towards a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, Constellations 10 (2003), 453), but I keep to Zürn’s interpretation sketched out at IV below.
8. ECR [I963], 24 f. Van Gend en Loos.
9. OJ C 158/1989, 400 and C 205/1994, 518.
10. Cf. Tilmann, ‘Eine Privatrechtskodifikation für die Europäische Gemeinschaft’, in
Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 485.
11. See the Decision of the European Parliament on the approximation of Member
States’ civil and commercial law, [COM(2001) 398–C5-047l/2001–2001/2187(COS)] of 15
November 1001, A5-0384/2001.
12. Commission Communication on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11
July 2001.
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it has accomplished in terms of existing elements of European private
law? Or should Europe embark on further legislative measures? The
Commission summarized responses to these questions in its Action
Plan of 12 February 2003.13
The Commission carefully avoids taking a definitive position. But
the project of a European Civil Code has had a mobilising effect
throughout legal science.14 The most prominent academic writer and
also one of the most ardent advocates in favour of a European code is
Christian von Bar.15 Which of the arguments expressed in his views
seem to suggest a position of methodological nationalism? Von Bar
more than others emphasizes that legislation should draw on the
authority of science and scholarly deliberation rather than politics. His
views quite accurately reflect the self‐understanding of German schol‐
arly thought in the 19th century during the construction of the German
Civil Code.16 The German Civil Code put into effect the uniformity of the
German Reich and thus symbolizes the emergence of a German nation
state. A European Civil Code could play a similar part, as contribution
towards European state‐building, supplementing the political constitu‐
tion of Europe.
II. Comparative Law
The process of European integration has brought about a renaissance
of comparative law. For long decades it was—in Germany and else‐
where—virtually self‐evident that comparative research would focus
on American law, and only on American law. In the meantime, the
Common Core project alone attracts, year after year, a growing number
of comparative lawyers from all over Europe and the rest of the world
to Trento.17 Comparative case books are available.18 European universi‐
13. Communication of the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council: A
Coherent European Contract Law, Action Plan, OJ C 43/2003, 1.
14. See summary by Schmid. Juristenzeitung, 2001, 694, updated in his habilitation
thesis (note 1), part 3, section 2; especially on the expert working groups on the Europeanization of private law, see: Riedl, Vereinheitlichung des Privatrechts in Europa, 2004.
15. See programmatically Von Bar, ‘From Principles to Codification: Prospects for
European Private Law,’ Columbia Journal of European Law 9 (2002), 379.
16. See poignantly Jakobs, Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im bürgerlichen Recht
nach der Rechts- quellenlehre des 19, Jahrhunderts, 1983, 160: the German Civil Code is ‘…
a code of law, the sources of which can be found not in itself, but in the legal science that has
created it; a code of law seeking to be dominated by, rather than to dominate, science...’ (my
translation); see for closer analysis Joerges, Kritische Justiz, 1987, 166.
17. Bussani/Mattei (eds.), The Common Core of European Private Law, Essays on the
Project, 2002; on this and with a further impressive summary of the discipline’s status quo,
Gambaro, ‘The Trento Theses,’ Global Jurist 4 (2004), No. 1, Article 2.
18. Von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. l, I998; Van Gerven/Lever/

21

Duke Law CICLOPs | Christian Joerges

Vol. 1

ties have extended their intra‐European comparative research with
some enthusiasm, provoking not only quantitative but also qualitative
improvements—a real renaissance.
Again, it would be adventurous to try to force what has become a
rich and diverse theoretical debate into a uniform agenda. And just as is
the case for European law, the claim that comparative law is pervaded
by methodological nationalism may alienate the reader at first. But it
holds true, in my view, as shall be demonstrated by turning to the views
of two important exponents and opponents. Reinhard Zimmermann, on
the one hand, reveals in his numerous works that the common Euro‐
pean legal heritage, the ius commune europaeum continues to have a
considerable impact in continental civil law systems and throughout
the English (but not the American) common law. He seems to be
sketching out the foundations of a position in favour of transnational
and non‐state private law.19 But in his theoretical approach, Zimmer‐
mann combines historical studies and practical work on law. His writ‐
ings on legal history are meant to provide support to non‐legislative
codification movements. It comes as no surprise that the title of the
first section of the Introduction to the Historical‐Critical Commentary
on the German Civil Code reads: ‘The European Codification Move‐
ment’.20 The section reads further: ‘the codifications have not rendered
learned jurists redundant, nor have they led to a permanent consolida‐
tion (or fossilisation) of private law. But they did facilitate, on the one
hand, national fragmentation of legal traditions…on the other, the codi‐
fications ended the ‘second life’ of Roman law, the history of its direct
practical application… .’21 The Europeanization of private law cannot
and should not rewind the clock of history. But historical legal scholar‐
ship is trying to feed into it an awareness of its pan‐European founda‐
tions—to boost the European codification project which would create
and symbolise a uniform European legal space.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of comparative contributions
is Pierre Legrand.22 His non‐convergence thesis, his rigid opposition

Larouche/von Bar/Viney, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Scope of Protection, 1998.
19. See Zimmermann, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 193 (1993), 122–169: idem,
Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in Hartkamp/Hesselink/Hondius/Joustra/Du Perron
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 2nd ed. 1998, 21; idem. ‘Savignys Vermächtnis,’ in
Caroni/Dilcher (eds.), Norm und Tradition, Welche Gerschichtlichkeit für die Rechtsgeschichte?, 1998, 281.
20. Zimmermann, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar, paras. 1 ff. before § 1 (2003).
21. My translation.
22. Poignantly, e.g.: ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging,’ International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 45 (1996), 52; ‘Against a European Civil Code,’ Modern Law
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against functionalism in comparative law and against codification
movements is based upon the assertion that common law and civil law
cannot communicate because the law is a cultural phenomenon and
European legal cultures have developed, quite simply, in an incompati‐
ble way. Both Zimmermann and Legrand loosen ties between law and
the nation state. Yet, both remain themselves tied to a methodological
nationalism. Zimmermann in that he seeks to follow the example of
historical legal science in the codification movement, Legrand in that he
deduces from the cultural features of common law and civil law their
political autonomy.23
III. Private International Law
European and Private International Law (PIL) lived separate lives for a
long time, encouraged by a culture of non‐communication where Euro‐
pean lawyers were part of public law and PIL‐lawyers part of private
law. Thus, for a long time it went practically unnoticed that the Euro‐
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) adjudicated constellations that had already
been thoroughly thought through by PIL. Nowhere did overlaps receive
greater attention and were discussed earlier than in Germany. Discus‐
sions can be separated into several stages: One phase, where PIL was
recommended as an alternative to projects suggesting unification of
law.24 A second one, still ongoing, where European law—in particular
its fundamental freedoms and the ban of discrimination, but also its
provisions on mutual recognition of binding law—was and is used to
correct PIL.25 A third phase is approaching. This phase will see the
choice‐of‐law methodology pulling away from its traditional home
discipline and in particular from its orientation towards a geographical
idea of justice. This is happening in two ways. For one, inconsistencies

Review 60 (1997), 44.
23. These are no more than cursory remarks. Hein Kötz, representing the leadingfunctionalistschool of comparative law, has always been sceptical towards the idea
of codification, see his Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, Festschrift Konrad Zweigert. 1981,
481; methodologically strict exponents of the common core project are agnostic in terms of
legal policy: e.g. Bussani, ibid. (note 17), but also Mattei, ‘Hard Code Now!’, Global Jurist
Frontiers, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), Art. 1. The Gretchen question, however, remains whether
comparative law can give up its perception of autonomous legal systems. How can we conceptualise their interdependencies and the emergence of multi-level systems with interconnected competences?
24. See e.g. Kreuzer, ‘Die Europäisierung des internationalen PrivatrechtsVorgaben
des Gemeinschaftsrechts,’ in: Müller-Graff, Gemeinsames Privartecht in der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft, 1993, 273.
25. See Grundmann, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht
64 (2000), 457. Summary and analysis of current developments in Schmid (note 1), especially in part 3, section 1.
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within and between national law 26 and European law 27 will be recon‐
structed as ‘collisions’ and conflicts arising from the institutionalization
of different rationality criteria. Accordingly the idea that law could be
set up as a stable, permanent and ‘uniform’ system will be done away
with. Contributions describing the law of a multi‐level system and in
particular European law as a Kollisionsrecht, a ‘collision law’, increas‐
ingly demonstrate a thinking of law in constantly recurring collisions.28
More on this will be said below.29
IV. Interim Conclusion and Anticipation: the Misery of Methodological
Nationalism in Europe’s Postnational Constellation
The claim that our categories of legal science and our individual disci‐
plines attach themselves to the nation state is anything but exciting.
Equally, it should not come as a surprise that legal science—in constitu‐
tional and administrative as well as private law—draws on national
and federal examples. The connected question, however, whether—in
legal sociological terms—it is possible to halt the evolution of law be‐
yond the nation state, and—in legal theoretical terms—the debate sur‐
rounding the normative legitimacy of these developments, bear some
potentially explosive issues.
The situation in the European Union inevitably requires a look, as
indicated above, into the political science research on integration. For a
long time, we have been reading that Europe is more than an interna‐
tional organization, but less than a federation.30 To understand its posi‐

26. Intellectually groundbreaking but little noticed: Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenzfalsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen zur
selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm, Festschrift Kegel, 1977, 223; analysis by Teubner. ‘Der
Umgang mit den Rechtsparadoxien: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter,’ in: Joerges/Teubner
(eds.), Rechtsverfassungrecht, Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie, 2003, 22.
27. See Joerges, ‘Legitimationsprobleme des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts und der
Vertrag von Maastricht,’ in: Brüggemeier (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, 1994, 91.
28. Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective,’ European Law Journal 3
(1997), 378; Furrer, Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext. Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht als Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in dax europäische
Wirtschaftsrecht, 2002; Amstutz, Zwischenwelten, Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im europäischen Privatrecht, Joerges/Teubner, ibid. (note 26), 213; Vesting, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 63 (2004), 41, 65 ff.; Schmid
(ibid. note 1) part 3, section 1; Teubner/Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collision: How the Emergency of Private Governance Regimes Changes Global Legal Pluralism,’ Michigan Journal of
International Law, 2004 (forthcoming).
29. Below B. II. and C. I.
30. W. Wallace, `Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a
Political System,’ in H. Wallace/W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Commu-
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tion between these two poles as a ‘multi‐level systems sui generis’ is
somewhat of a dominating view in political science31 which is being
further substantiated in respective studies. Before introducing the idea
into legal science, it should be reconstructed in normative categories.
But this is anything but easy. In his essay introducing the ‘postnational
constellation’ as a term of art,32 Jürgen Habermas posed the crucial
question whether there was a future for democracy. Democracy was
institutionalised in (national) constitutional states.
Therefore, postnational constellations are highly ambivalent; they
constitute not an achievement but rather a challenge. The thesis in
which Michael Zürn diagnoses the misery of methodological national‐
ism33 suggests that we cannot avoid the challenge, because our entry
into the postnational constellation is not at our disposition. His diagno‐
ses affect mostly the contextual conditions of political action:34 The
nation state is no longer in a position to define its political priorities
autonomously (as sovereign), but instead is forced to coordinate them
transnationally. Not only must their members (national citizens) rec‐
ognise their political action; states have also become accountable to
transnational bodies where their politics are being subjected to evalua‐
tion. To be sure, national governments continue to vehemently defend
their fiscal powers. “Whilst resources remain (in most part) at national
level, the formulation of politics has been internationalised and recog‐
nition transnationalized.”35
How will this type of multidimensional disaggregation of state‐
hood affect the law? First of all, we should be prepared to find the
transnational (European) level of politics confronting national law with
a range of demands arising from the interconnectedness of nation
states (in other words, the logic of integration of societal sub‐systems),
and from the project of integration and its institutionalised political
telos manifested in the European Treaties. Neither the national nor the
transnational dimension gives a firm halt; both are instead themselves
in a state of contingent development. The thesis suggesting that we are
and will be witnessing tensions between a functionalist logic of market
integration institutionalised in the Treaties and a normative logic of
justification, of RechtFertigung, institutionalised at national level, in

nity, 1983, 403.
31. Instructive are contributions to Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische
Integration, 2nd ed., 2003.
32. Above note 6.
33. Above note 7.
34. Ibid., 188-191.
35. My translation; ibid., 188.
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my view continues to have much persuasive force as a starting point
and basis for approximation.36 It implies: law has to learn how to ac‐
commodate disaggregated competences of action and the fact that in a
European multi‐level system the ‘higher’ level’s competences are re‐
stricted to the fields enumerated in the Treaty, that Europe hence can‐
not form a hierarchical system but instead relies on a plethora of policy
networks and on cooperative problem solving. Any attempt to illustrate
or concretise these formulae is bound to fail the systematic expecta‐
tions and traditional thought patterns.
B. EXEMPLA TRAHUNT: THREE PATTERNS OF EUROPEANIZATION OF
PRIVATE LAW
‘Less than a “system”, but more than just a set of contingent case law’—
thus the claim of the following analyses of the practice of
Europeanization of private law. It would be unrealistic to accredit to
the law the power to assert itself as a ‘system’ within the complex and
conflict ridden territory of the European multi‐level system. But any
suggestion to break the law down into a string of individual cases
would be equally far from reality. Three sets of examples are being
introduced, exemplifying in turn some significant patterns of
Europeanization of private law. Their ‘exemplicity’ is manifested
particularly in the range of options they uncover for integration policy.
In saying this, I implicitly suggest that these options include diverse,
even opposite perspectives. I also assert that their contest will not
come to a rest, that we should not expect any one pattern to acclaim a
monopoly at any time in the future. Rather, each individually will be
subjected to a range of experiences that in turn will provoke further
learning processes. Here is not the place to advocate normative
agnosticism. Having said that, it should be stressed that the law will
have to be prepared to deal with colliding concepts of Europeanization.
I. Product Liability Law: on the Destitution of Orthodox Supranationalism
The European Community Product Liability Directive was adopted
unanimously, under (the old version of) Article 100 TEC, on 25 July
1985.37 This explains why it records product liability law so incom‐
pletely,38 why it disappointed expectations especially of those who ex‐

36. See Joerges/Brüggemeier, ‘Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts,’ in:
Müller·Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Eurupäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 233.
37. OJ L 2l0/1985. 29.
38. Koch, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 (1988), 537.
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pected it to be the flagship of European consumer protection law.39
Intense debates surrounded the Directive’s implementation. It was
widely considered a marginal piece of legislation with little impact on
the general law of obligations because Article 13 of the Directive evi‐
dently did not respect claims pursuant to other legal bases.40 There was,
at any rate, broad agreement that the Directive would preclude further
advances in consumer protection law by establishing a set of conclusive
minimum standards.
For a long time, these expectations appeared justifiable, until, in
three relatively recent judgments of 25 April 2002,41 the ECJ shattered
them quite dramatically. The Court recognised to the great surprise of
most observers that the Directive’s consumer protection provisions
were not intended to introduce protective minimum standards, but
rather to achieve ‘complete harmonisation’ As a consequence, the Di‐
rective enjoys the standing of fully‐fledged European law: it is supreme
to national private law, takes precedence over subsequent national
legislation and creates a duty for national courts to refer to the ECJ.
The three decisions just mentioned concern the French, the Greek
and the Spanish implementation of the Directive. The Spanish case is
particularly frightening.42 Mrs. Gonzalez Sanchez had to have a blood
transfusion in the hospital run by the defendant institution (Medicina
Asturiana SA). As a consequence of the transfusion, she was infected
with the Hepatitis C virus. She based her action on the law by which
Spain had transposed the Directive into Spanish law and, in addition, on
the general liability provisions of Spanish civil law, and on the Spanish
General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users of 19 July 1984,
under which the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal con‐
nection. Under the Product Liability Directive, implemented 10 years
after the 1984 law,43 she also had to prove that the hospital had pro‐
duced the blood conserves, which she failed to show. Therefore, the
success of her claim depended on the relationship between the three
legal bases. Article 13 of the Directive provides that the Directive “shall
not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the

39. See Brüggemeier/Reich, Wertpapier Mitteilungen 1986, 149.
40. E.g. Brüggemeier, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152
(1988), 511, 531.
41. Case C-52/00, ECR [2002] I-3827 Commission v. France; Case C-183/00, ECR
[2002] I·3901 Mari}: MarÍa Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA; Case C154/00, ECR [2002] I-3879 Commission v. Greece.
42. On the following, see analyses by Arbour, ELJ 10 (2004), 87 and Schmid (ibid., note
1), especially part 2, section 4, chapter 5.
43. Case C-183/00 para. 7, 8.
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rules of the law of contractual or non‐contractual liability or a special
liability system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.”
Does this mean, the Spanish court asked the ECJ, that the Directive
could “be interpreted as precluding the restriction or limitation, as a
result of transposition of the Directive, of rights granted to consumers
under the legislation of the Member State?”44 To the unversed reader,
the question may sound rhetorical. But the Court responded: “Article
13 of the Directive cannot be interpreted as giving the Member States
the possibility of maintaining a general system of product liability dif‐
ferent from that provided for in the Directive.”45
The provision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different
basis cannot “be relied on in such a case in order to justify the mainte‐
nance in force of national provisions affording greater protection than
those of the Directive.”46
In its analysis of the Community law provisions, the ECJ refers to
Recital 1 in the preamble of the Directive, according to which “ap‐
proximation is necessary because legislative divergences may distort
competition and affect the movement of goods within the common
market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer
against damage caused by a defective product to his health or prop‐
erty.”47 It had been necessary at the time to introduce this sentence, in
order to ‘establish’ the Community’s (functional) legislative compe‐
tence. Since then, the paragraph has become neither more empirically
relevant, nor normatively more correct. Nevertheless, the Court’s
judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological motivation for
restricting Member States’ legislative autonomy.48
European law, understood this way, does not contribute much to
the Europeanization process. The preliminary rulings procedure has
good institutional sense because it links the judiciary in Member States
to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. But it can bear painful consequences for
those who seek justice in a case that would not normally seem prob‐
lematic.49 After long years of litigation, Mrs. Sanchez finally knew whom
she would have had to sue in order to enforce her rights. A result such
as this one would be easier to accept, if we could see in the ECJ’s judg‐

44. Ibid., para. 13.
45. Ibid.. para. 30.
46. Ibid., para. 33.
47. Ibid., para. 3.
48. Ibid., paras. 24, 25.
49. More generally Joerges, ‘The Bright and the Dark Side of the Consumer’s Access to
Justice in the EU,’ Global Jurist Topics 1 (2001): No. 2, Article 1.
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ment a constructive contribution to the development of product liabil‐
ity law. But this is hardly possible.50
II. Company Law: Economic Freedom and Political Rights of European
Citizensand their Bars
The judgments in Centros,51 Überseering52 and Inspire Art53 are part of a
single complex which should be discussed in unity, but at this point I
will focus on a particular aspect often shaded by a plethora of literary
analysis. From the interplay between the economic freedoms, the legis‐
lative and the judiciary, emerges the right to hold the national sover‐
eign to account for its legislation and to confront it with the legal
rationality of its European neighbours—this to me is the normative
significance of the Centros case law, but equally its practical weakness.54
The judgment in Centros concerns the core of the European legal
acquis, namely the freedoms of market citizens which apply directly and
ought therefore to take primacy over national law. The decision was
widely praised as a milestone in the realization of the market freedoms,
as a contribution to the so‐called negative integration and the opening up
of regulatory competition; but it also has wider implications.
A Danish married couple, Marianne and Tony Bryde, wished to
import wine into Denmark. For this they planned to set up a company,
but did not want to pay the fee of the DK 200,000 (28,000 Euro) that
Denmark required for the registration of companies. In May 1992 they
founded a private Limited company in England, the now legendary
Centros Ltd., and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen—for none of these
steps did they need the money that a regular registration in Denmark
would have required. Unsurprisingly, the Danish authorities refused
registration. The Brydes went to court. Seven years later, the ECJ
handed down the following judgment to the referring Danish
Højesteret. It found, rightly, that:
It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Mem‐
ber State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed

50. See below C. III.
51. Case C-212/97, ECR [1999] I-1459 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen.
52. Case C-208/00, ECR [2002] I-9919 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC).
53. Case C-167/01, Kanter van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art
Ltd, U. of 30 September 2003.
54. See Joerges, ‘Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts. Überlegungen zu
einem Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU,’ in Joerges/Teubner, ibid.
(note 26), 183, 189–194.

29

Duke Law CICLOPs | Christian Joerges

Vol. 1

in accordance with the law of another Member State in
which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no
business where the branch is intended to enable the com‐
pany in question to carry on its entire business in the state
in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the
need to form a company there, thus evading application of
the rules governing the formation of companies which, in
that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a
minimum share capital.55
Did the Court permit the Brydes, in Gerhard Kegel’s well phrased
words,56 to ‘cock a snoot’ at the law? Or, and this may be the case’s most
popular reading, was it the ECJ’s intention to allow for a more efficient
legal framework for company law in Europe?57
Maybe the truth lies in the middle? What is so abusive, really,
about setting up a company in another Member State with a seemingly
more beneficial regulatory system? Should we not simply understand
it—as the ECJ does—as the exercise of a right afforded to European
citizens, a right which however will cede to legitimate regulatory con‐
cerns—foreclosing the concerns of those who warn against the superi‐
ority of economic against political reason. The ECJ did not push aside
Denmark’s right to enact compulsory provisions dealing with company
law. It placed Denmark under pressure to justify why Danish registra‐
tion fees would better serve the protection of creditors, which, accord‐
ing to the Danish government’s presentation, was the object of the
Danish legislation. The Court remained unconvinced, partly because
foreign companies were allowed to set up branches in Denmark with‐
out having to pay a registration fee.
There are obvious parallels to the jurisdiction on Article 28 TEC,
which since Cassis de Dijon, thus for the past 34 years, has repeatedly
found that Community law must preserve and respect national auton‐
omy (‘autonomieschonend’), whilst national laws must pursue their
legitimate regulatory interests in conformity with Community law
(‘gemeinschaftsverträglich’). In other words: Danish citizens have the
right to test their national sovereign in a European court—the Brydes
made use of their right. In case it is found to be in breach of European
law, the Danish legislator is given the chance to amend its laws—and it

55. Sentence 1 of the tenor of the judgment, ECR [1999] I-1947.
56. In his editorial in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (8) 1999
(`Es ist was faul im Staate Dänemark und anderswo...`).
57. See Eidenmüller, ‘Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa,’ ZIP 2002, 2233.
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has done so.58 The new regulation, justified by legitimate concerns of
the Danish government to secure tax demands, may be called into ques‐
tion again. It remains to be seen—e.g. whether the Brydes are again
prepared to invest 10 years to challenge existing Danish law.
Centros has not remained without consequences. The possibility
that interested actors would try to test how far their new freedoms
would reach and how much money they would save, was easily pre‐
dictable yet little investigated.59 Debate about the implications of Cen
tros in terms of legal systematique was however, dense; it helps us in
better understanding the two following decisions. In a reference for a
preliminary ruling by the Federal High Court of 30 May 2002 (Überseer
ing),60 the ECJ was asked whether German law could prevent a Dutch
plaintiff from suing for over 1,000,000 DM by, firstly, restricting in § 50
(1) of its Zivilprozessordnung locus standi to those legally competent
(rechtsfähig) companies, and secondly, by prescribing that a company
incorporated according to Dutch law could lose its legal capacity once it
transferred its activities to Germany in a way which constitutes, accord‐
ing to German law, a transfer of its ‘seat’ or legal headquarters (Ver
waltungssitz).61 In an internal market where freedom of establishment
exists as a right, such legal principles seem downright incredible.62 In
Inspire Art63 the ECJ continued its line of reasoning, and established: the
right of a company set up under English law to carry on business in the
Netherlands should be respected in principle; only for ‘good’ reasons,
not accounted for in European secondary legislation, may this funda‐
mental freedom be restricted.
The Centros judgment found Denmark’s regulatory interests per
se legitimate. In the follow‐up decisions, there was no need for the

58. See Trefil, Centros und die Niederlassungsfreiheit von Gesellschaften in Europa,
EUI Working Paper Law 2003/9, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf, 3l ff., referring to
www.retsinfo.dk and the doubts about the solidarity of the Danish ‘Sonderweg.’
59. lnstructively Baudisch. ‘From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on
Recent Developments in European Company Law,’ in Snyder (ed.), The European Union and
Governance, 2003, 24, 44 ff., who considers a ‘race to the bottom’ unlikely, because of
existing interests for businesses in their reputation.
60. German Federal Court, BGH Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2000, 412.
61. See para. 45 of the Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer on 4 December 2001 for
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. NCC GmbH.
62. Eventually the representation made by the German government, that the plaintiff
could have acted as a company without legal personality under German law (cited in AG
Colomer`s Opinion at para. 55: see also Roth, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2003, 117, 123 f.), will not suffice; poignantly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Akteingesellschaft 2003, 30.
63. Case C-167/01, U. v. 30.09.2003, Kamer van Koophandel v. Inspire Art Ltd., Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2003, 3331.
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Court to discuss the bars to the fundamental freedoms. But these ques‐
tions have become increasingly pressing: how are the general reasons
in favour of the ‘seat’ theory (Sitztheorie)—protection of creditors and
of subsidiary companies; co‐determination; avoidance of double taxa‐
tion—to be accounted for in the future? Not by invoking the seat the‐
ory! In Europe’s multi‐level system, the latter is equally as obsolete as
its counterpart, the ‘incorporation’ theory (Gründungstheorie). Both
have no place in Europe’s postnational constellation.64 Their objectives
must be expressed in different terms 65 and addressed in a way so as to
conform with Community principles.66

III. Altmark Trans: Public Services after Privatization
One of the most important characteristics of the Europeanization proc‐
ess is that it disconnects what is traditionally considered ‘private law’
from its regulatory context. This is one of the inevitably disintegrative
effects of integration, legally rooted in one of the Community’s core
principles: the EU’s competences are restricted to the fields enumer‐
ated in the Treaty. Amongst them we find practically the whole field of
regulatory law, and the Community has used those competences exten‐
sively.67 The real world, however, continuously brings up constellations
where the demarcation of competences in the Treaty does not corre‐
spond with real existing and interconnected regulatory problem con‐
stellations. Typically, the European level is competent to regulate one
aspect of a problem, whereas Member States remain competent to

64. Clearly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2003, 681, 685.
65. Especially Schanze/Jüttner, ibid., and Ulmer, Juristenzeitung 999, 662 and Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2004, 1201 illustrate convincingly how this is possible.
66. The German co-determination rules are the most complicated, because they lack
any functional equivalent elsewhere (see Dammann, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 607).
Co-determination may not be imposed on an undertaking simply because it uses its right to
establishmentand vice versa: Community law may not dispense with an institution such as
the German co-determination procedure, simply because it disturbs companies' freedom of
establishment. It is instead left to initiate political processes through institutionalisation of
existing tensions. An example, at first sight a little remote: the practices engaged by Microsoft
in the US and in the EU are judged differently in either legal order. But where the EU, as was
declared by the Commission on 24 March 2004, imposes its law in Europe, then it takes away
de facto rights and freedoms Microsoft enjoys under US law. The EU can avail itself of a legal
framework that does not leave these types of dilemmas to lie [with expected effects: see
Sadowski/Junkes/Lindenthal, Labour Co·determination and Corporate Governance in Germany, in: Schalbach (ed.). Corporate Governance, Essays in Honor of Horst Albach, 2nd ed.
2003. 144].
67. Jacques Delors in a slightly outdated but much cited statement announced that 80
per cent of the economic law in Member States should be determined by the Community.
Delors. ‘Europa im Umbruch. Vom Binnenmarkt zur Europäischen Union.’ in Kommission der
EG (ed.), Europäische Gespräche, vol. 9. 1992, 12.
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regulate another one. The term ‘diagonal’ is used to distinguish such
constellations from, on the one hand, ‘vertical’ conflict resolutions
where Community law trumps national law, and from ‘horizontal’ con‐
flicts which arise from differences among the Member States’ legal
systems and which belong to the domain of PIL on the other.68 The term
‘diagonal conflicts’ captures a structural characteristic of the European
multi‐level system. Neither the European level nor the national level is
in a position to address a specific problem in its entirety: European and
national actors are forced to coordinate.
Examples are legion, even though they do not always appear in the
literature under the heads I have just indicated.69 I restrict myself to
one: The Altmark Trans judgment of 24 July 2003 70 illustrates the impli‐
cations of the privatization71 of public services, induced by European
law; these Europeanized so‐called ‘Services of General Interest’ or
‘Daseinsvorsorge’ are controversial because they meet with firmly em‐
bedded national regulatory traditions, expectations and interests. The
regulations they affect are not as much intertwined with private law as
they may be in constellations where national private law pursues regu‐
latory goals that may collide with some goals of European regulatory
law. However, privatization initiatives are a major concomitant of inte‐
gration; they affect the realm of private law as they determine to what
extent services can be brought by and in conformity with the market.
‘Daseinsvorsorge’ was brought under the auspices of public law on
the basis that it affected basic human requirements in industrialised
times. The German term was coined by no less than Karl Jaspers before
1933. The fact that Ernst Forsthoff in 1938 re‐applied the term in the
context of administrative law 72 is no argument as such. In any case, it is
correct to say that in the first place Daseinsvorsorge had to gain the
social and democratic legitimacy used today in its defence. Those who
acknowledge its value, e.g. the British social philosopher Steven Lukes,
must fear the ‘invasions of the market’73 in Europe; those who find no

68. See also Schmid (note 1), part 3, section 1, sub-section 1, chapter 2.
69. But see Schmid (note 1), part 3, chapter 2.
70. Case C·280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. Regierungspäisidium Magdeburg und
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, nyr.
71. On this process see ‘Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe`
(COM (1996) 443 final of 11 September 1996), ‘Report on Services of General Interest`
(COM (2001) 598 final of 17 October 2001) and the ‘Green Paper on Services of General
Interest` (COM(2003) 270 final of 21 May 2003).
72. ‘Daseinsvorsorge als Aufgabe der modernen Verwaltung,’ idem., Die Verwaltung als
Leistungsträger, 1938.
73. Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market,’ in Dworkin et al. (eds.), From Liberal Values to
Democratic Transition, 2003. Lukes argues within the anglo-saxon tradition: ‘As Marshall
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place for it in a social welfare state, such as the expert committee to the
German Federal Ministry of Commerce, would regard its protection by
legal norms as an encroachment of ‘the citizens’ subjective rights, guar‐
anteed by the Community, to unhampered participation in the cross‐
border transfer of goods and services’.74
Altmark Trans concerned subsidies awarded to public transport
undertakings in the Landkreis of Stendal in Germany. The case itself
may seem insignificant, yet the ensuing questions are of fundamental
importance: should availability of public transport be organised on the
basis of social welfare and distributional justice or on the basis of effi‐
ciency? Is this an openly political question to be decided by the German
Lander and communes, or a legal question for Community law to an‐
swer? The ECJ knew not to decide these questions definitively, but in‐
stead to design a legal framework which leaves room for political
processes and decisions—and still protects European concerns. This is,
it seems to me, the core message of the decision which also brought up
difficult questions of law concerning the interplay between secondary
Community law and the German public transport law (Personenbe
förderungsgesetz) as amended in 1995. Altmark Trans GmbH and
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH both sought to organise public transport
in the Landkreis of Stendal in Sachsen–Anhalt, one of the German
Lander. Altmark had been licensed, and got the license renewed by the
Regierungspräsidium, whereas the bid of Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH
was rejected. The central question of law occupying the ECJ was: did
the subsidies given to Altmark Trans after it had been granted the li‐
cense to organise bus traffic in the Landkreis Stendal qualify as state
aid within the meaning of Art. 87 TEC? If yes, then they would be sub‐
ject to the Commission’s competences under the Treaty provisions on
state aid.
The Court’s response sounds like old‐fashioned legal formalism:
following its own case law, the Court finds that an official act does not
constitute state aid within the Treaty unless it includes an ‘advantage’
to the beneficiary undertaking. Advantages for the purpose of state aid
exclude financial means provided by the state by way of compensation
argued, the first half of the twentieth century saw the acquisition by citizens of a range of
basic services to which they could claim entitlement as citizens, services funded and provided
by the state and thus excluded from the scope of the market. These are sometimes seen as
constituents of ‘social citizenship’ but they can, equally, be seen as supplying the preconditions for core citizenship by enabling citizens to acquire and maintain the capacities needed
for its equal exercise.’
74. My translation; see Expert Committee to the German Federal Ministry of Commerce
[Wissenschaflicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft], ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ im
europäischen Binnenmarkt, 2002, 7.
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for public service obligations taken on by the service provider. But the
Court goes further, operationalizing its own distinction by four crite‐
ria:75 (1) The recipient must be required to discharge clearly defined
public service obligations; (2) The parameters of the calculated com‐
pensation must be established in advance in an objective and transpar‐
ent manner; (3) The compensation must not exceed costs plus a
reasonable profit; (4) Decisions are to be taken either after a public
procurement procedure or the level of compensation is to be deter‐
mined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of typical undertaking,
well run and adequately provided with adequate means of transport.
These responses do bear some problems. They need to be further
concretized and their implementation will be challenging. But they
have high normative qualities: European law does not take a stand for
or against the organisation of public services through national welfare
states; it decides neither for nor against the market. Instead it puts
justificatory pressure on national politics and forces those who organ‐
ise public services to explain how they fulfil their social mandate. It
‘constitutionalizes’ the multi‐level system so as to accommodate the
decentralised exercise of formative (national) political freedom, whilst
at the same time allowing for European concerns to afford market ac‐
cess to non‐local suppliers. And if this were to prove a successful solu‐
tion guaranteeing and manifesting some social sense in national
practices, then it would be an achievement that so far has remained
hardly conceivable in most integrated political systems 76—a ‘proce‐
dural’ conflict solution par excellence.
C. VERBA DOCENT: ON THE PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY OF THE
EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS
What I am now trying is to bring the abstract deliberations in the first
part and the analyses of the second part into a synthesis. I will proceed
in three steps. The first follows the understanding of Europe as a multi‐
level system, to demonstrate its implications for integration policy.
Normative dependencies of political action become apparent in this
process and are being re‐conceptualised, in a second step, in legal cate‐
gories. In a final step l will sketch out the legal constitution of the Euro‐
peanization process itself, which, it is my claim, must be designed
procedurally, in order to overcome the impasses of European law and
the methodological nationalism in comparative law and PIL.

75. Case C-280/00 (note 68), paras. 89–95.
76. See, Zürn/Joerges (eds.), Governance and Law in Post-National Constellations.
Compliance in Europe and Beyond, 2005.
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I. Farewell to Orthodox Supranationalism
Europe is no federation, but more than a regime. It is a heterarchically
structured multi‐level system. It must organise its political action in
networks. Since the powers and resources for political action are lo‐
cated at various and relatively autonomous levels in the EU, the coping
with functionally interwoven problem‐constellations will depend on
the communication between the various actors who are relatively
autonomous in their various domains, but at the same time mutually
dependent.77 Jürgen Neyer formulated his thesis in a most concrete
fashion, usually avoided by political scientists: the EU‐specific condi‐
tions for political action favour a deliberative mode of communication
that is bound by rules and principles and where arguments are ac‐
cepted only if they are capable of universal application.78 These consid‐
erations can help legal science to satisfy an undeniable need to afford
its declarative statements some normative value. But they cannot sub‐
stitute the argumentative construction of normative statements specific
to law, and they leave room for additional argumentation. To translate
Neyer’s argument: the European legal framework is not designed
merely to secure fundamental freedoms; but neither to create a new
European state. The purpose of European law is instead to discipline
the interactions necessary within the Community to act politically. It is
to guide strategic action into a deliberative style of politics. It should
leave behind ‘vertical’ (‘orthodox’) supranationalism and instead found
its validity as law on the normative (deliberative) quality of the political
processes that create it.79 To which we may add:80 No state in Europe
can make or refrain from making decisions without causing ‘extra‐
territorial’ effects on its neighbours. Provocatively put, but brought to
its logical conclusion, this means: nationally organised constitutional
states are becoming unable to act democratically. They cannot include
in the electoral processes, determining the democratic sovereign, all
those who will be affected by their decisions. And vice versa: their citi‐
zens cannot influence the behaviour of those political actors who are
77. See above A. IV.
78. ‘Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Govemance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003), 687; more detailed in his habilitation
thesis, Postnationale politische Herrschaft, 2004.
79. See Joerges/Neyer, with Jürgen Neyer. ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology,’ 3 (1997) European
Law Journal 273; Joerges, ‘Good Governance’ in the European Internal Market: Two Competing Legal Conceptualisation of European Integration and their Synthesis,’ in: von Bogdandy/Mavroides/Mény (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination. Studies
in Transnational Economic Low in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 2002, 219.
80. See Joerges, ‘The Impact,’ ibid. (note 28).
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taking the relevant decisions for them. It would thus seem legitimate
for Europe to require its Member States to design their national laws
with a view to accommodate Community law. It would also seem sensi‐
ble to afford Member States’ citizens legal rights that are truly Euro‐
pean because they allow national citizens to compare their own laws
with the laws and the experiences in other Member States.
II. European Law as Choice of Law and the Constitutionalization of
Transnational Governance
The normative claims identified above of ‘deliberative supranational‐
ism’ should not be portrayed as some remote wish list. They are well
documented and somewhat canonised in real existing European law:
Member States of the Union may not enforce their interests and their
laws unboundedly. They are bound to respect European freedoms.
They may not discriminate. They may only pursue ‘legitimate’ regula‐
tory policies approved by the Community. They must coordinate in
relation to what regulatory concerns they can follow, and design their
national regulatory provisions in the most Community‐friendly way.
What is the meaning of all this, for the relationship between European
and national law in general, and the Europeanization of private law in
particular?
Two complementary patterns of legalisation, of Verrechtlichung,
and responsibilities for the law, may be differentiated. All of the above
principles and rules substantiating a ‘deliberative suprnationalism’
affect how we deal with differences between laws. They impose a duty
on Member States to take into consideration ‘foreign’ affairs and inter‐
ests. To European law, they have assigned the task of making sure that
national law is compatible with Community principles. In that sense,
the law of the Community is a ‘choice‐of‐law’ (‘Kollisionsrecht’). It does
more than traditional PIL, in that its decision‐making criteria are not
there to identify the geographically closer or factually preferable law or
decide between colliding interests in the application of the law. It does
not work on the assumption that between equally involved national
laws a choice should be made. Rather, it requires national laws to be
made Community‐compatible through innovation and modification,
and the development and observance of principles and rules, in order
to organise the differences between them. All these factors impose
limits on national sovereignty. In addition, Union citizens are afforded
rights that are directly applicable in their own as much as in foreign
Member States—forcing a duty on the national legislator to justify its
actions in a European forum.
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Member States are being asked to make changes to their legal sys‐
tems—changes that should in principle take place there, for them to
effectively guarantee that Europe’s innovative impact will help national
legal systems to evolve sensibly.81 However, this is but one side of the
process. Building on just those measures that are promoting free trade
and the Europeanization of our markets and rejecting the individual
states’ interests and orientations, European transnational governance
structures have developed and unfolded their own logic and signifi‐
cance.
This holds true for all domains of regulatory policy 82—including
the traditional realm of ‘private law’, at least indirectly.83 And in all
those fields where private law instruments are being deployed for the
organization of transnational activities, suitable arrangements are
likely to establish themselves. Regulatory politics have seen an intense
debate for some time on the question of how these new forms of trans‐
national governance can be conceptualised legally (‘constitution‐
alized’). Discussions are equally intense in the area of competition pol‐
icy after its ‘modernization’ in Regulation 1/2003.84 85 It is only a matter
of time for those discussions to reach private law.
III. Juridifying the Europeanization Process
Private law cannot ignore the postnational constellation it finds itself
placed in. It cannot pretend there is still a set of autonomous national
legal systems. It can do equally little about the fact that Europe is not a
state, and is not on its way to statehood. All it can do is try to bind po‐
litical processes to legal principles and to influence law making in the
European multi‐level system. The literature on Europeanization of
private law talks too little about these framework conditions. It is not
obvious which legislative institution in Europe would be competent to
write a Civil Code that could absorb the rich diversity of European legal
traditions. It is not obvious how any such Code could keep pace with
the evolutionary dynamic of regulatory politics. There are no signs of
an expansion of the European judiciary, yet an expansion seems indis‐

81. See the remarks in note 28 and also Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law,’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2
(1999), 231.
82. See Joerges, Europarecht 2002, 17.
83. See above B. III.
84. OJ L 2003/1 of 4 January 2003. See also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/
85. The Commission home page gives an impression: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/
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pensable, if the new law is to enjoy effective validity.86 The status quo is
anything but ideal. Europeanization takes place in an incremental and
fragmented fashion. Citizens seeking to enforce their legal rights are
being subjected to unacceptable burdens. Yet, over all we are facing an
innovative process full of opportunities.
Typically, the most problematic amongst the case law constella‐
tions analysed in part two is the one that rigorously brings to bear the
principles emerging from the formative period of European law. The
ECJ ‘s thesis that the provisions of the Product Liability Directive have
effected a ‘complete harmonisation’, undeniably ignores that if product
liability law is to be applied sensibly, it should be placed in the particu‐
lar context of elements of fault and liability, objective standards of neg‐
ligence, product safety legislation and self‐regulation (standardization
and certification). It is hard to imagine how the ECJ could not have
taken these circumstances into account, but equally difficult to see how
its punctual intervention could contribute sensibly to the Europeaniza‐
tion of product liability and product safety law.
Things are different for company law. Here the ECJ pronounced
clear and consistent orientation points in a way that is manageable for
secondary Community law as well as national legal systems. The ECJ
has conferred political rights on the ‘market citizen’, without affording
either the market or market citizens law‐making powers. The Court’s
findings on the privatisation of public services appears to me equally
productive. Legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences,
administrative know‐how and market innovation—all these are very
different between Brittany and Estonia, between Faroe Islands and
Sicily. Europe seems destined to institute innovation and to encourage
social learning. It is not Europe’s job to subject the continent to a uni‐
tary regime.
The incrementalism of the Europeanization process is challenging
but also full of opportunities. Europe is no polity in the way nation
states are. It will have to live with its complex diversity illustrated in
the case law above: primary law granting fundamental freedoms and
basic rights; transnational governance arrangements in numerous

86. ‘Kommt die Geschäftswelt nicht ganz gut zurecht?’—‘but isn’t the business world
doing quite well?’—Ernst Steindorff asked more than a decade ago (see the report of the
symposium ‘Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvergleichung‘ by Oliver Remien in Rabels
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 56 (1992), 261 ff., 300 ff.], just to
re-pose the question now (Aufgaben künftiger europäischer Privatrechtssetzung angesichts
deutscher Erfahrungen, Festschrift Peter Ulmer 2003, 1393, 1407, note 63) and to add to its
context: those who lobby for greater legislative ambit in Europe should also ask for a corresponding expansion of Europe's judiciary’s powers which nobody will be eager to finance.

39

Duke Law CICLOPs | Christian Joerges

Vol. 1

fields of regulatory politics; legislative and judicial interventions affect‐
ing only a section of the national legal systems and leading to irritation.
This diversity creates by no means a comfortable situation. Maybe we
will find that its complexity exceeds our learning capacities. But I am
confident that it makes no sense simply to imagine a more simplistic
legal landscape.
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